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Abstract
This paper analyses the declarative readings of logic
programming. Logic programming - and negation as
failure - has no unique declarative reading. One com-
mon view is that logic programming is a logic for de-
fault reasoning, a sub-formalism of default logic or au-
toepistemic logic. In this view, negation as failure is
a modal operator. In an alternative view, a logic pro-
gram is interpreted as a definition. In this view, nega-
tion as failure is classical objective negation.
From a commonsense point of view, there is definitely
a difference between these views. Surprisingly though,
both types of declarative readings lead to grosso modo
the same model semantics. This note investigates the
causes for this.
Introduction
Logic’s fundamental role in the area of computing and
artificial intelligence, is its use for knowledge represen-
tation. There may be innumerable ways in which some
domain knowledge can be encoded in a logic theory;
however, there is one principle which most consider as
the canonical way of using logic. Declarative knowl-
edge representation operates according to the following
principle:
the expert represents his domain knowledge by a
set of formal statements that are true in the prob-
lem domain.
This principle relies on the ability of the expert to in-
terpret a logical axiom as a clear and precise statement
about the domain of discourse. The ability of interpret-
ing the formulas of a logic as meaningful statements
about the problem domain -given some interpretation
of the user-defined symbols- is the declarative reading
of the logic. It is based on a clear understanding of the
connectors and quantifiers and of how composed axioms
combine these meanings.
A declarative semantics of the logic can be defined as
a formal study of its -intuitive- declarative reading. As
such it should contain the following parts:
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• a clear account of some declarative reading of the
formulas and theories in a logic;
• a mathematical characterisation of a formal seman-
tics;
• a justification why and how this semantics charac-
terises this declarative reading.
In a sense, a declarative semantics should relate a logic
to some part of the human cognition and understand-
ing. Note that a simple way of defining a declarative
semantics of a logic is by providing an embedding in
another logic with a well-established declarative seman-
tics. Such semantics are sometimes called transforma-
tional semantics.
The declarative reading of logical axioms gives logic
a decisive advantage over other languages. It allows
the expert to compare a formal statement with his or
her knowledge and to evaluate its truth, without going
through the painful process of explicitly constructing
the mathematical semantics of the axioms. This ideal is
reached most clearly in classical logic. So, our common
expert knowledge allows us to recognize the statement
∀x.person(x)→ male(x) ∨ female(x)
as true (given the obvious intended interpretation of the
predicate symbols), and the statement
∀x.male(x)↔ female(x)
as false. We can do so on the basis of our intuitive un-
derstanding, without having to construct the semantics
of these sentences, i.e. their class of models.
It is a fact that to be able to represent knowledge in
a declarative way and to benefit the potential advan-
tages of this type of knowledge representation, a hu-
man expert must have acquired a deep and precise un-
derstanding of the declarative reading of the logic that
he is using. Ambiguities and unclarities on the level of
declarative reading cause ambiguities and unclarities on
the level of knowledge representation. For this reason,
studies of declarative reading are of key importance in
the development of knowledge representation method-
ologies.
This paper is a study of the declarative reading(s)
of logic programming. The history of the declarative
semantics of logic programming is well-known. Orig-
inally, the picture was simple and clear: the declara-
tive reading of a Horn logic program was the declara-
tive reading of a set of classical logic implications. The
introduction of negation as failure blurred this simple
view. On the one hand, negation as failure derived con-
clusions with a strong commonsense appeal and turned
out to be very useful and natural in many practical
situations. On the other hand, the negation as failure
inference rule was unsound with respect to the declar-
ative reading of a program as a set of classical impli-
cations. As expressed by Przymusinski (Przymusinski
1989), “we really do not want classical logic seman-
tics for logic programs. .. We want the semantics of
a logic program to be determined more by its common-
sense meaning.”. All main semantic investigations since
the end of the seventies (least model semantics (van
Emden & Kowalski 1976), completion (Clark 1978),
perfect model semantics (Apt, Blair, & Walker 1988;
Przymusinski 1989), stable model semantics (Gelfond
& Lifschitz 1988), well-founded model semantics (Van
Gelder, Ross, & Schlipf 1991)) attempted to formalise
and explicitate this commonsense meaning of logic pro-
grams.
The question considered in this paper is to what ex-
tent the commonsense meaning referred to by Przy-
musinski has been identified: what is or are the declar-
ative reading(s) of logic programming and what are the
corresponding meanings of its symbols not,←. What
are the semantics that correspond best to these declar-
ative readings?
The analysis of the declarative reading of logic pro-
gramming is complicated by at least two factors. One
complication is that different formal semantics exist (in
2-, 3- and 4-valued versions). In particular, stable and
well-founded semantics are generally considered as the
main ones. However, there is a second complication
which is more subtle and much more dangerous. Let
me try to pinpoint this problem.
It is well-known that logic programming can be
used for representing many different sorts of knowl-
edge (Baral & Gelfond 1994): (inductive) definitions,
defaults, reflective knowledge of experts, etc.., both un-
der well-founded semantics and stable model semantics.
Remarkable though is that the same logic program or
rule in a logic program can be used to represent knowl-
edge with a decidedly distinct commonsense flavor. For
example, we might represent the definition that dead
means not alive by the rule:
dead← not alive
The interpretation of this rule as a definition of dead is
explicitated by the completion semantics (Clark 1978),
Clark’s embedding of logic programming in classical
logic. If the rule defining dead is the only rule with dead
in the head, the completion will contain the equivalence
dead↔ ¬alive
Since stable and well-founded models are models of the
completion, this rule is satisfied also in these models.
On the other hand, consider the reflective knowledge
of the distrustful man who is unhappy if he does not
know that his wife is faithful to him. His reflective
knowledge can be represented by the same rule (modulo
renaming) as in the above scenario:
unhappy← not wife faithful
Indeed, Gelfond’s embedding of logic programs in au-
toepistemic logic (Gelfond 1987) maps this rule to the
autoepistemic formula:
unhappy← ¬Kwife faithful
which directly represents the knowledge of the distrust-
ful man.
Gelfond’s embedding defines a transformational
declarative semantics for logic programming. It formed
the knowledge theoretical foundation for stable model
semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1988); therefore we are
entitled to assume that stable semantics is conceived to
represent this sort of knowledge. Note here that nega-
tion as failure is interpreted as a modal operator and the
implication operator as classical implication. This is a
common feature of all embeddings of logic programming
in autoepistemic logic (AEL) and in default logic (DL).
Another important embedding is Marek and Truszczyn-
ski’s one to DL (Marek & Truszczyn´ski 1989). It maps
he above rule to:
: ¬wife faithful
unhappy
For an overview of different embeddings see (Marek &
Truszczyn´ski 1993)).
From the commonsense point of view, there is a defi-
nite distinction between both pieces of knowledge. The
definition of dead expresses that in the actual state of
the world, dead and alive are mutually exclusive: the
exclusive “or” holds between them. If the expert does
not know whether alive is true or false, then he does
not know whether dead is true or false. On the other
hand, the knowledge of the distrustful man does not
imply any relationship between the unhappiness of the
distrustful man and the loyalty of the spouse in the ac-
tual state of the world. It is perfectly possible that in
the actual state of the world, she is not loyal but he
does not know and he is happy.
Consider the logic program program {p ← not q}.
All main semantics coincide for it; its formal semantics
(i.e. the set of its models) is the unique model {p}. Yet,
as illustrated above, Clark’s embedding and Gelfond’s
embedding assign two different commonsense meanings
to this program:
• In the completion, the program states that q is false
(because of the empty definition) and that p is true
iff q is false.
The model represents the state of the world in which
p is true and q is false. According to the completion,
this is the only possible state of the world.
• The program in Gelfond’s embedding states that p
holds if q is not known to be true.
Since in this interpretation, the program has no
knowledge about q, q is unknown, hence p is entailed.
Note that contrary to the first reading, here q is not
known to be false.
What is proven in (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1988), is that
the stable model represents the set of believed atoms
of the above theory: {p} means that p is believed,
and that the truth of q is not believed.
Based on our intuition, what can be said about the
possible states of the world in this reading? Obvi-
ously, since q is unknown, there should be states in
which q is true and states in which q is false; p should
be true always. Hence, the two possible states are {p}
and {q, p}.
Moore (Moore 1984) defined a possible world seman-
tics for AEL. Intuitively, a possible world model is a
set of possible states of the world according to the ex-
pert’s knowledge. The unique possible world model of
the theory {p← ¬Kq} is exactly the set {{p}, {q, p};
this confirms our intuition.
The above discussion leads to a key point of this pa-
per: even if we know the models of a logic program, we
still cannot decide the intended declarative reading. We
can only know -to some extent- what is the declarative
reading if we know also what is the role of the model.
A mathematical definition of some collection of models
of theories in a logic cannot define a declarative read-
ing. In this sense, a model theory is not a declarative
semantics in its own right.
In the sequel, a model semantics will be called a pos-
sible state semantics for some declarative reading if it
characterises the possible states of the world; a model
theory will be called an atomic belief set semantics of
some declarative reading if it characterises the sets of
believed atoms in this declarative reading.
It is not a simple task to search for the declarative
reading(s) of logic programming. In the first place,
many of the early semantical studies in the context of
logic programming are not primarily concerned with
finding and formalising a commonsense meaning, but
are more concerned with finding a mathematical justi-
fication for the reasoning techniques in Prolog.
Other studies are more focussed on the commonsense
meaning, but fail to give a clear account of the for-
malised declarative reading and the role of the models.
There is an enormous amount of mathematical results
on the relationships between different model semantics.
However, because atomic belief sets and possible states
are incomparable objects, it is a priori not clear what
these relations mean on the level of declarative reading.
Moreover, in many knowledge representation examples,
one can observe that the same semantics is used once
as an atomic belief set semantics, once as an possible
state semantics.
In order to clarify the role of logic programming for
Knowledge representation, the question of declarative
reading of logic programming cannot be circumvented.
In the rest of the paper I will try to pinpoint the main
ideas on declarative reading and the confusions on this
topic.
Declarative readings of logic
programming
An investigating of the transformational semantics that
have been proposed for logic programming, gives some
insight in the possible declarative readings of logic pro-
gramming.
It seems to me that at least in the non-monotonic and
A.I. oriented part of the logic programming community,
logic programming is now routinely seen as a sub-logic
of default logic or autoepistemic logic. In this view, the
negation as failure is interpreted as a modal negation.
This view has a natural motivation: a Prolog system is
said to infer a negative literal not p when it is unable to
prove p. A natural way of modeling failure to prove in
semantics is as not knowing. From here, it was natural
to interpret not p as ¬Kp.
All main logic programming semantics - least model,
supported model, 3-valued supported model, perfect
model, stable model, 3-valued stable model and well-
founded semantics - have been justified as atomic be-
lief set semantics of diverse modal interpretations of
logic programming. The methods that have been used
are analogous as Gelfond and Lifschitz’s justification
for stable semantics: one defines an embedding of logic
programming to some non-monotone modal logic and
the models of the logic program are shown to be the set
of believed atoms. In these transformational semantics,
models of logic programming semantics systematically
play the role of a set of believed atoms. For an overview
of these results, I refer to (Marek & Truszczyn´ski 1993).
On the other hand, I believe that there is also a
persistent and strong intuition that among all classi-
cal models of a logic program, there is a canonical one
(or at most a small number of canonical ones) which
represents the unique possible state of the world. The
Clark completion semantics was an early, weak attempt
to identify this canonical model. In this view, negation
as failure does not need to be interpreted as a modal op-
erator: it is classical objective negation denoting falsity
in the canonical model.
The main questions are what declarative reading of
logic programming could explain the existence of a
unique possible state and how could this unique model
be mathematically characterized?
These questions were considered in (Denecker 1995;
Denecker 1998). The idea is to read a logic program as
an inductive definition. From the very start, logic pro-
grams were considered as definitions. This was Clark’s
basic idea with the completion semantics. Note that
Clark’s completed definitions are identical to the way
(non-recursive) definitions are expressed, for example
in Beth’s studies.
The evident problem with Clark completion seman-
tics is that it does not deal well with inductive defi-
nitions. On the other hand, least model semantics is
known to deal right with positive inductive definitions
such as transitive closure. Using the above terminology,
the least model semantics can be said to be possible
state semantics for the reading of Horn programs as in-
ductive definitions. In fact, as pointed out in (Denecker
1998), the methods that have been used to character-
ize monotone induction are identical to those that were
used to characterize least model semantics of Horn pro-
grams.
Can we extend the view of Horn logic programs as in-
ductive definitions to programs with negation? In (De-
necker 1998), I have argued that the use of induction in
mathematics is not restricted to positive induction. An
example is the induction in a well-founded set. To some
extend, a generalised form of non-monotone induction
have been studied in the area of inductive definitions,
the so called Iterated Inductive Definitions (Feferman
1970). As I showed, this formalism is isomorphic mod-
ulo syntactic sugar with stratified logic programs under
perfect model semantics. Further on, I have pointed
to several intolerable weaknesses of this stratified ap-
proach as a formalisation of generalised induction and
have argued that these problems are solved by the well-
founded semantics. Or, the argument there was that
the well-founded semantics is a possible state seman-
tics of the declarative reading of logic programs as gen-
eralised inductive definitions1.
Consequently, logic programming has not a unique
declarative reading. The modal view and the defini-
tion view are both consistent ways of interpreting logic
programs; moreover they lead to very similar model
theories, though these theories have different roles.
The above phenomenon, the existence of different
consistent declarative views on the same formalism is
a potential source of considerable confusion. In the re-
maining sections, I investigate possible confusions.
Distinguishing between declarative
readings
Comparing declarative semantics
The mathematical relations between the least model,
models of the completion, the perfect model, stable
models and well-founded model are understood quite
well. The question I consider here is what they tell
about the relations between the two types of declara-
tive readings.
A naive comparison of different semantics of logic
programming is misleading. For example, the collec-
tion of stable models is known to be a subset of the
collection of models of the completion. What does this
1Note that well-founded semantics has been motivated
both as an atomic belief set semantics and as a possible
state semantics.
result mean on the level of the declarative readings un-
derlying both semantics?
Not much it seems. E.g. the possible world model
of Gelfond’s embedding and Marek and Truszczynski’s
embedding of the program {p ← not q} is the set
{{p}, {q, p}}; this is a proper superset of the (single-
ton) set of models of the completion. Consequently, in
the case of this particular program, the completion is
strictly stronger than the default or AEL reading.
Expressing knowledge declaratively
Consider a logic with an atomic belief set semantics
for its declarative reading. Assume that the models
of a logic theory are exactly the possible states of the
world according to the expert’s knowledge. This theory
encodes the expert’s knowledge but obviously, it is not
necessarily a declarative representation of the expert’s
knowledge. In general the declarative reading of the
theory does not justify that the models are the only
possible states of the world. In fact, it may well be that
part of the axioms of the theory are false statements
about the domain of discourse.
The above phenomenon can be illustrated in LP.
Since stable semantics is an extension of least model
semantics, it is suitable to encode positive inductive
definitions such as the one of transitive closure:
p(a, a)←
p(b, c)←
tr(X,Y )← p(X,Y )
tr(X,Y )← p(X,Z), tr(Z, Y )
The unique stable model indeed represents the unique
possible state of the graph and its transitive closure.
But this does not necessarily mean that inductive
definitions can be expressed under the default reading
of logic programs. For example, the meaning of this
program under Gelfond’s embedding is identical to its
classical logic meaning (since AEL is a conservative ex-
tension of classical propositional logic).
This problem gives rise to unsoundness. For example,
with the inductive definition, the expert knows that
p(a, b) and tr(a, b) are false. Yet, the AEL embedding
entails ¬Kp(a, b) and ¬Ktr(a, b).
In the case of the transitive closure, the modal declar-
ative reading (as expressed under the above mentioned
AEL and DL embeddings) of the axioms is true but
too weak to justify the unique model. An example
where the declarative reading would be plainly false
can be given by a variant of the dead and alive ex-
ample. Assume that the expert wants to represent the
definition that dead means not alive, as represented by
dead↔ ¬alive. A possible way to do this using stable
semantics is:
dead← not alive
alive← not alive∗
alive∗ ← not alive
The two stable models (after projection on the two
atoms alive, dead are identical to the models of the
equivalence. Yet, it is easy to see that both the AEL
and DL embedding assigns false meaning to the first
axiom. Indeed, it is not true that dead is true if one
does not know that alive is true.
Mixing different declarative readings
The presence of multiple declarative readings and mul-
tiple roles of models raises complications on the level
of methodology. This becomes obvious when different
roles are mixed.
Consider what happens if the different sorts of declar-
ative readings are used in the same program. Recon-
sider the example of the distrustful man. Assume that
we want to add the definition that to be happy means
not to be unhappy. According to the completion, this
knowledge is correctly represented by the rule:
happy ← not unhappy
What happens if we combine this rule with the reflec-
tive knowledge of the jealous husband. Consider the
program:{
unhappy ← not wife faithful
happy ← not unhappy
}
This program consists now of two isomorphic state-
ments which are both true, but under different declar-
ative readings. Note that again all semantics for this
program coincide. The model is {unhappy}. What does
this model mean? Consider the two options that arose
earlier:
• If this model is to be interpreted that unhappy is true
and wife faithful and happy are false, then there is
a mismatch with our understanding because neither
the truth of unhappy nor even the knowledge that
unhappy is true is a sufficient condition for happy
being false. I.e. happy should be unknown.
• On the other hand, if the model is interpreted as a
belief set, there is again mismatch with our under-
standing because since wife faithful is unknown,
then also unhappy should be unknown.
Whether the model is interpreted as a possible state or
as the belief set, it contains an error.
Extending Logic Programming
This paper focuses on the original logic programming
formalism with only the original negation as failure,
and does not investigate its extensions with classical or
strong negation. At this point, it is clear that there is
natural reason for that. A point of this paper is exactly
that in one commonsense view on logic programming,
negation as failure is classical negation. It is clear then
than in this view, the formalism cannot be further ex-
tended with another classical or strong negation. Ex-
tensions of logic programming with classical negation
(including disjunctive logic programming) make sense
only in the modal negation view on logic programs.
Logic programming extensions were designed as a
way to solve a number of serious disadvantages of logic
programming for knowledge representation. However,
as argued in (Denecker 1995), the analysis of what are
these disadvantages exactly, depends on the declarative
reading one takes. Different declarative readings lead
to different conclusions and more importantly they sub-
sequently lead to different ways to different extensions
of the formalism.
In the case of the modal views, the problem was the
absence of classical negation. However, as argued in
(Denecker 1995), the problem of logic programming un-
der the definition view is that a logic program contains
definitions for all predicates. For this reason, one should
extend the formalism with the possibility of leaving cer-
tain predicates open. This view is further explored in
(Denecker 2000).
References
[Apt, Blair, & Walker 1988] Apt, K.; Blair, H.; and
Walker, A. 1988. Towards a theory of Declarative
Knowledge. In Minker, J., ed., Foundations of Deduc-
tive Databases and Logic Programming. Morgan Kauf-
mann.
[Baral & Gelfond 1994] Baral, C., and Gelfond, M.
1994. Logic programming and knowledge representa-
tion. Journal of Logic Programming 19/20:73–148.
[Clark 1978] Clark, K. 1978. Negation as failure. In
Gallaire, H., and Minker, J., eds., Logic and Databases.
Plenum Press. 293–322.
[Denecker 1995] Denecker, M. 1995. A Terminological
Interpretation of (Abductive) Logic Programming. In
Marek, V.; Nerode, A.; and Truszczynski, M., eds.,
International Conference on Logic Programming and
Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Lecture notes in Artificial
Intelligence 928, 15–29. Springer.
[Denecker 1998] Denecker, M. 1998. The well-founded
semantics is the principle of inductive definition. In
Dix, J.; nas del Cerro, L. F.; and Furbach, U., eds.,
Logics in Artificial Intelligence, 1–16. Schloss Dagh-
stull: Springer-Verlag, Lecture notes in Artificial In-
telligence 1489.
[Denecker 2000] Denecker, M. 2000. Extending classi-
cal logic with inductive definitions. In Baral, C., and
Truszczynski, M., eds., 8th Intl. Workshop on Non-
Monotonic Reasoning (NMR2000), 1–15.
[Feferman 1970] Feferman, S. 1970. Formal theories
for transfinite iterations of generalised inductive defi-
nitions and some subsystems of analysis. In Kino, A.;
Myhill, J.; and Vesley, R., eds., Intuitionism and Proof
theory. North Holland. 303–326.
[Gelfond & Lifschitz 1988] Gelfond, M., and Lifschitz,
V. 1988. The stable model semantics for logic pro-
gramming. In Proc. of the International Joint Con-
ference and Symposium on Logic Programming, 1070–
1080. IEEE.
[Gelfond 1987] Gelfond, M. 1987. On Stratified Au-
toepistemic Theories. In Proc. of AAAI87, 207–211.
Morgan Kaufman.
[Marek & Truszczyn´ski 1989] Marek, V., and
Truszczyn´ski, M. 1989. Stable semantics for
logic programs and default reasoning. In E.Lust, and
Overbeek, R., eds., Proc. of the North American Con-
ference on Logic Programming and Non-monotonic
Reasoning, 243–257.
[Marek & Truszczyn´ski 1993] Marek, V., and
Truszczyn´ski, M. 1993. Nonmonotonic Logic
Context-Dependent Reasoning. Springer-Verlag.
[Moore 1984] Moore, R. 1984. Possible-world seman-
tics for autoepistemic logic. In Non-Monotonic Rea-
soning Workshop, 344–354.
[Przymusinski 1989] Przymusinski, T. 1989. On the
declarative and procedural semantics of logic pro-
grams. Journal of Automated Reasoning 5:167–205.
[van Emden & Kowalski 1976] van Emden, M., and
Kowalski, R. 1976. The semantics of Predicate Logic
as a Programming Language. Journal of the ACM
4(4):733–742.
[Van Gelder, Ross, & Schlipf 1991] Van Gelder, A.;
Ross, K.; and Schlipf, J. 1991. The Well-Founded
Semantics for General Logic Programs. Journal of the
ACM 38(3):620–650.
